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PRACTICING HOPE 
Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung 
Abstract: In this essay, I consider how the theological 
virtue of hope might be practiced. I will first explain 
Thomas Aquinas's account of this virtue, including its 
structural relation to the passion of hope, its opposing 
vices, and its relationship to the friendship of charity. Then, 
using narrative and character analysis from the film The 
Shawshank Redemption, I examine a range of hopeful 
and proto-hopeful practices concerning both the goods 
one hopes for and the power one relies on to attain those 
goods. In particular, I show how the film's picture of 
the role friends and friendship play in catalyzing hope is 
a compelling metaphor for Christian hope's reliance on 
God. 
Is hope a virtue? If so, then it is meant to be practiced. Thomas Aquinas 
calls virtue, whether acquired or infused, an "operative habit," that is, a 
disposition ordered toward acting well-since even infused virtues must 
be exercised. 1 In the words of Benedict XVI, "The one who hopes lives 
differently" (2007, sect. 2; emphasis added). 
Contemporary usage of the term 'hope' usually refers to a feeling, a 
wish, or an optimistic disposition toward the future. While there is nothing 
wrong with this usage, and while psychological states and personality traits 
may certainly affect an agent's practice, I want to consider hope as a virtue- 
that is, as a lasting feature of an agent's character. To recover the notion 
of hope as a virtue and to illustrate how it might be practiced as such, 
I will consider Thomas Aquinas's treatment of the theological virtue of 
hope in dialogue with the film The Shawshank Redemption. The analogues 
of hope in the film, along with actual examples of prison life, highlight 
two points: first, that hope is essential for human flourishing, and second, 
that practices of theological hope in particular are relational. Specifically, 
they are embedded and encouraged especially within friendships, of which 
friendship with God is an exemplary kind. 
'Hope' is commonly used to mean wishing for or wanting something 
whose future attainment is uncertain. Aquinas'S account of the virtue of 
hope likewise takes hope to involve a desire for a future good that is not 
yet attained, but it is also more than this. The theological virtue of hope in 
1 In what follows, all citations from the Summa theologiae are from Aquinas (1981). 
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the Summa theologiae concerns a desired future good whose attainment 
requires a habitual willingness to depend on another-namely, God. In this 
essay, I will show how the character of Ellis Boyd "Red" Redding (played by 
Morgan Freeman) in The Shawshank Redemption provides an analogue of 
this virtue and points to practices of hope that involve reliance on others.r 
Before examining Red's hope, however, I will argue that Andy Dufresne, 
the film's main character, fails to exhibit the dependence characteristic of 
theological hope, although his character still offers hints of what the object 
of hope must be like, whether it is desired inside or outside of prison. Using 
the film's narrative, "lived" examples, I will show that a deeper spiritual 
conception of hope illuminates dimensions of the human quest for goodness 
obscured by the current, often casual use of the term. Interpreting the film's 
characters in light of Aquinas'S analysis of hope also illuminates a range of 
hopeful and proto-hopeful practices. 
In this essay, I will first explain Aquinas'S account of the theological 
virtue, including its structural similarity to the passion of hope, its opposing 
vices, and its relationship to the friendship of charity. Second, I will evaluate 
Andy's claim to hope, arguing that while it falls short of the theological 
virtue, both Andy's character and the film's treatment of the goods Andy 
loves and longs for still anticipates important features of virtuous hope and 
its practice. Third, I will consider the ways in which Red's hope can be read 
as a picture of Christian hope. In the last section, I will draw conclusions 
from this dialogue between Aquinas and The Shawshank Redemption about 
practices characteristic of those with the virtue of hope.:' 
1 Aquinas on Hope 
1.1 Passions and Virtues 
Aquinas'S accounts of the virtues are built on his moral psychology in the 
questions on the passions. Hope-the passion and the virtue-therefore 
share a basic structure, the structure of desire. 
Hope is the middle movement in love's threefold logical structure (Lom- 
bardo 2011, 55). After envisioning an object as "good for us" (complacen- 
tia), the appetite can move toward that good with longing (concupiscentia), 
as a future good to be attained. This state of the appetite-desire as mo- 
tion toward the end-essentially characterizes the passion of hope (ST I-II 
40.1).4 The last moment in the threefold structure of love is "enjoyment" 
2 In this essay I consider the story as retold in the film, not the original short story by Stephen 
King. 
3 I do not intend to offer an exhaustive list of such practices, but only those suggested by the 
dialogue between the film and Aquinas, especially friendship. A study of, say, Victor Hugo's 
Les Miserables or the film Glory would no doubt generate additional examples of practices. 
4 Socrates, in his conversation with Agathon, makes the same point in Plato's Symposium. 
Desire is for a good that one lacks and wants to possess. He also argues that even when 
one does possess some good one can still desire it if one's desire is to have the good as one's 
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(fruitio), which is Augustine's and Aquinas'S name for delight in the object 
as actually and finally possessed. This psychological structure is found at 
the level of both the sensory and the rational appetites. Thus the virtue of 
hope will be a disposition to desire a loveable good and to move toward it 
until one possesses it and one's desire is finally at rest. 
Unlike other uncomplicated desires, hope comes in to play when future 
possession of the good yearned for is not only uncertain, but when its 
attainment also involves some difficulty or taxing effort.? In Aquinas'S 
terms, hope is desire for an arduous future good, which is difficult but 
possible to obtain (ST I-II 40.1). (The common use of hope as 'desire' or 
'desire for something of uncertain outcome' or even 'wish' tracks Aquinas 
but and does not typically include this further feature.) Hope's object is thus 
complex; its desire must face and overcome difficulties, while maintaining 
the possible attainment of that good as its motivational focus." Whether 
and how a desired but difficult good is possible to obtain turns out to be 
the key to his conception of hope as a theological virtue. 
If the good one seeks seems possible to get, even with great effort and 
struggle, then one feels hope. On the other hand, despair looms when the 
difficulty seems too great to overcome, and the good, therefore, does not 
seem attainable. This is why having the energy to persevere in one's pursuit 
of something good and showing eagerness to attain it are signs of hope, 
while resignation and inactivity are characteristic of those who despair, and 
complacency is characteristic of those with presumption. 7 
The passions are responses to what the agent perceives, so that one's 
perception of the object (sometimes different from the reality of the matter) 
shapes the agent's appetitive reaction.f The important point is that things 
that shape one's perception of a situation can be pivotal for maintaining 
or abandoning hope. Hopeful desires, in turn, can further shape one's 
perception of a situation, producing a kind of virtuous circle. On Aquinas's 
account, the virtue of faith enlarges one's vision of the good and works in 
tandem with the virtue of hope to stretch one's confidence that one will 
attain that good.? 
own "forever" and one still lacks-at the present moment-the future possession of this good 
(1979, 199D-200E, 206A). 
5 The uncertainty of attaining the object is not a feature of the theological virtue, nor is it 
necessary as a feature of Aquinas's conception of the passion, but inscrutability is a common 
feature of situations in which hope is in play. 
6 It thus also differs from the passion of daring, which is caused by hope, but has the attack 
and removal of an approaching evil obstacle to something good as its motivational focus. 
7 Robert Miner (2009, 226-227) makes the point that the passion of hope "promotes activity." 
8 Aquinas is well aware (and insists, in his discussion of prudence's relation to the moral 
virtues) that this dynamic goes both ways: one's appetitive orientation and formation also 
shapes one's grasp of the world. 
9 On the close relationship between faith and hope, see also Benedict XVI's analysis of Hebrews 
11:1 (2007, sections 2 and 8). 
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Hope comes in two forms-a sense of possibility based on one's own skill 
or power, and a sense of possibility based on help from others who are able 
and willing to assist one.l" Aquinas's concept of hope will not make a virtue 
of human achievement or individualistic self-reliance. Even in his analysis 
of the virtue of magnanimity, the virtue that perfects the passion of hope, 
he transforms Aristotle's account by arguing that a virtuous assessment 
of one's own power requires a supernatural perspective, which includes 
regarding one's own power itself as a gift from God.11 The resources one 
believes one has-everything from one's own finances and physical strength 
to psychological resources such as the support of one's friends-make a 
great deal of difference when it comes to fostering and maintaining hope. 
The theological virtue of hope specifically relies on both the divine power 
(God's ability to help those who need it) and the divine mercy (God's 
willingness to help those who do not deserve it). 
As a theological virtue, hope relates a human being to God in two ways: 
as the end hoped for (final cause) and the essential means to that end 
(efficient cause). The one hoping desires the good of a relationship of loving 
union with God and desires God's help to attain it. Cultivating hope as a 
theological virtue will therefore require seeking one's own fulfillment or 
happiness as a good that is possible to realize through the help of another. 
It will require learning to rely on another for help. For Aquinas, hope is a 
virtue of acknowledged dependence and learned trust. Further, the goal of 
hoping is not a good that is solely one's own: it is a relationship, a good 
that one shares with another. 
1.2 Vices Opposed to Hope 
The vices opposed to hope-despair and presumption-both close off one's 
yearning for a possible future good by treating the good as other than 
possible to attain. They do so in opposite ways. Presumption's stance 
toward the good assumes that its attainment is already actual, rather than 
being a future possibility; appetitively speaking, the presumptuous person 
is identical to one who has the good already in his or her possession. In the 
vice of despair, on the other hand, the appetite responds to the future good 
as if it is impossible to attain and is closed off forever. 
10 "A thing may be possible in two ways, namely by one's own power, or by another's. 
Accordingly when one hopes to obtain something by one's own power, one is not said to wait 
for it, but simply to hope for it. Properly speaking, one is said to await that which one hopes 
to get by another's help as though to await (expectare) implied keeping one's eyes on another 
(ex alia spectarei .... Therefore this movement of hope is sometimes called expectation" (ST 
I-II 40.2). When discussing the theological virtue, Aquinas says: "Now a thing is possible 
for us in two ways: First, by ourselves, and secondly, by means of others .... Therefore, 
whenever as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the divine assistance, 
our hope attains God himself, on whose help it leans" (ST II-II 17.1). 
11 For a fuller discussion of Aquinas on magnanimity, see DeYoung (2004), Miner (2009, 
227-229), and Herdt (2008, 77-80). 
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Josef Pieper argues that both despair and presumption trade on a lived 
denial of the human condition as a "status viatoris"-that is, a condition of 
being on the way to one's ultimate end, but not there yet (1986, 47). This is 
the human condition in this life because union with God is possible now but 
not yet completely possessed. Both the one who presumes and the one who 
despairs live as if the human person had already and permanently arrived at 
one final end oranother. In presumption, one's appetite rests prematurely as 
though one is already eternally blessed; in despair, one's will acquiesces to 
being already damned (ST II-II 18.2-3 ).12 The vice of despair thus enacts an 
internally contradictory condition of "living death." 13 Aquinas implicitly 
characterizes both presumption and despair as types of false rest. To hope 
is therefore to live in accord with the truth of the human condition. One is 
still on the way toward something greater, something future, and something 
that draws one beyond oneself and one's current position. Human lives 
ought to be marked by desire for a good toward which they must continue 
to move (and be moved). 
The difference between presumption and hope, therefore, does not 
consist primarily in the degree of cognitive certainty about one's attainment 
of the end. After all, on Aquinas's account, the hopeful one possesses the 
certitude of faith: she knows that, should she continue to hope and strive 
for her supernatural end, she can be assured-on the testimony of God, not 
because she sees this truth for herself-of God's assistance in helping her 
reach that end (ST II-II 18.4).14 Insofar as the hoped-for good depends on 
God's abilities and character, then, the end is "completely assured" (Roberts 
2003,282).15 As long as that good is not actually, fully, or permanently 
present, however, the will of one who hopes must still incline and move 
one toward it. 
Although the film is silent about the theological dimensions of the human 
predicament, the prisoners in Shawshank struggle with despair, and many 
12 If one names despair itself as a terminus, the progression toward despair should not be 
counted as despair itself, but only a movement of the will toward such a disposition or stance. 
For more discussion, see DeYoung (Forthcoming). 
13 Despair involves living a contradiction in which one has a natural desire for one's ultimate 
end while one simultaneously cuts oneself off from desiring the necessary means to get it. 
Both disordered stances of the will-presumption and despair-further imply that the divine 
assistance, as the description under which God is the object of hope, is no longer possible for 
oneself. 
14 See ST II-II 4.8 for Aquinas'S explanation of the certitude characteristic of faith. I take it 
to be the case that this cognitive condition may come apart from the subjective feelings of 
assurance on the part of the one hoping. 
15 Roberts takes the end of hope to be "a kingdom of justice and love in which God is honored 
as god and human relations are peaceful and mutually benevolent." If one takes hope's end to 
be the shalom of the new creation, this is a "completely assured prospect." Aquinas's account, 
however, makes one's own personal friendship with God the object (presuming that charity 
with God will then include the shalom that Roberts describes), in which case hope depends 
not only on God's power and mercy but on the willingness of the one hoping to receive them. 
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make it a way of life.16 Their practices are shaped accordingly; their gaze 
is directed down at the floor, not upward and outward; their shoulders are 
bent; their tasks are mere busywork and dull chores; they have no joy; and 
their laughter is harsh. Many inmates with life sentences will attest that 
their main spiritual struggle is to resist despair, lest they merely "do time" 
until the inevitability of death. They struggle with despair not only because 
of their guilt, but because they see no possibility of new life beyond their 
current state of punishment. Contrast the Shawshank prisoners' response 
with the spirituals of African American slaves in the antebellum South. The 
prisoners are resigned and they do not sing, while the slaves' songs lament 
their present sufferings and keen with yearning for future glory.V Their 
hymnody thus itself seems to be a practice of hope, as illustrated in the 
prebattle campfire scene in another Morgan Freeman film, Glory (1989). 
1.3 Developing Hope 
Both Aquinas and The Shawshank Redemption picture hope as an enduring 
task, something to cultivate and sustain over a lifetime. This picture fits 
the dispositional and practical profile of a virtue better than a wish or 
feeling. The developmental nature of the virtue is clearest when Aquinas 
distinguishes two forms of the theological virtue-imperfect and unformed, 
in contrast to perfect and formed. IS Unformed hope is the habit of relying 
on God's assistance to attain one's ultimate end for one's own sake. In 
unformed hope, love of self is therefore the ground of motivation. God is 
valued as an assistant, useful for the sake of achieving something the one 
hoping wants for herself. Hope is problematic and imperfect if it stays in 
this state, without being "formed" or perfected further by charity, which 
Aquinas defines as friendship or union with God.19 
Virtue-as a disposition formed and perfected through characteristic 
acts-is typically cultivated in stages, and realistically so. A child learns to 
love virtue for its own sake not by beginning with virtuous motivations, but 
by being given rewards and punishments, incentives and disincentives to 
perform virtuous deeds-deeds that are not desired (at this early stage) for 
their own sake. The goal, however, is to progress beyond this initial stage, 
through habituation and practices that gradually discipline the passions and 
16 Of course they need not be aware of or articulate about the nature of their existential 
commitment. Many thinkers from Kierkegaard to Pascal to Dostoyevsky recognize that one 
can be in despair and not be conscious of it. 
17 This is one reason why the film's music scene is so powerful. Despair deliberately shuts 
out from one's gaze any beauty that might shake one out of one's condition and teach one to 
yearn again for something more. In a conversation about this point with Robert C. Miner, he 
has pointed out that there is likewise no music in Dante's Inferno-only noise. 
18 Formed by charity, that is: charity is the "root and mother" of all perfect (i.e., infused) 
virtues; for Aquinas this means it is their formal cause (ST II-II 23.8). 
19 See also Aquinas (ST II-II 19) and DeYoung (2012) on the gift of fear associated with the 
developmenr of rhe rheological virtue of hope. 
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form the intellect and will. Through practice, the person learns to become 
"the sort of person who does this sort of thing" and to think of herself in 
this way. The end of the process is the stage in which virtuous activity 
is easy (or at least easier), enjoyable, and valued for itself. She no longer 
needs to consider rewards and punishments to choose virtue; in fact, she 
will do the virtuous thing even if it does not bring extrinsic rewards. She 
wants to do the virtuous thing because she wants to be a virtuous person 
and live a life that is fitting and good, which she now understands to be a 
virtuous life. At this mature stage of moral development, the grown person 
has become someone who endorses her upbringing and values the goods 
that her moral tutors valued. Moreover, she values them now in the way 
her moral tutors do (Burnyeat 1980, 188-189). 
Aquinas thinks human spiritual development in hope typically works in 
a similar way. He describes this process as the move from what he calls the 
love of desire, where objects are loved for one's own sake, to the love of 
friendship, of which charity is the paradigmatic case. The move from the 
love of desire to the love of friendship looks like this: At first, the hopeful 
person desires her own supernatural happiness and understands that God's 
assistance is required for it. Her own power, she sees, is clearly insufficient. 
So she relies on God's power to get what she wants for herself-her own 
happiness. However, Aquinas says, the process of relying on God in a 
habitual way over a suitable period of time allows her to get to know God 
better and to find him not only powerful but also merciful, ready to lovingly 
and faithfully supply her needs. Through this process of habitual reliance, 
the one hoping develops a relationship with God, and learns to know him 
and the sort of good she longs for better.2o She comes to appreciate that 
her own fulfillment is found in just such a friendship. If all goes well,21 she 
begins to love God back, now as a friend, loved for who he is and not just 
what he does for her. In Aristotelian terms, she passes through an imperfect 
friendship of utility to gain a virtue friendship, where she loves the other 
for his own sake, as "another self" (1999, IX.4 1166a30). The one hoping 
still desires God's power and mercy as necessary means to assist her to 
her ultimate end, but now she also loves the one assisting her as a friend. 
Already while "on the way" one gets a taste of what it is like to love and 
be loved as a friend of God.22 Over time, the disposition of hope initially 
prompted by one's need for God's assistance is perfected by love. 
20 Learning to hope might thus be well characterized as a "dialectical activity." According to 
Brewer (2009, 47) engagement in such "temporally extended and self-deepening" activities 
"itself tends to produce a clearer and more ample appreciation of the goods internal to that 
activity" as one progresses. Brewer's examples of dialectical desires include love of God and 
love of others (56-65). 
21 This presumes that the requisite grace is given. For Aquinas, this is necessary for any virtue 
to be perfected by charity, since charity is always an infused virtue. 
22 Aquinas says that hope already attains God, on whose help it leans (ST II-II 17.1). Charity, 
too, has both a "now and not yet" character, as a disposition that is infused but increasingly 
perfected in this life, until it is completely perfected in union with God in the next. The mode 
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In this case, hope keeps one's eyes on God's provision of the eternal good 
of friendship with himself, despite the pain and loss of earthly goods, even 
in the middle of suffering. 
In these ways, hope refrarnes and reorganizes other hopes for more 
proximate activities and ends.23 It seems right to say that having the theo- 
logical virtue of hope should temper fear of the death of a loved one from 
illness, loosen one's grip on comforts and luxuries, soften disappointments 
with career aspirations that went to ruin, bolster one's commitment to 
faith-inspired projects that seem a "stretch" from the point of view of one's 
current resources, lead one to positions of vulnerability and boldness that 
one would not venture to risk if not for an eternal perspective on one's life 
and vocation, and so on. Given the reorientation of the self toward the 
ultimate end and the self's position of total reliance on God to realize that 
end, one would expect hope to saturate motivation thoroughly (desires and 
aversions) in ways that shape daily practice. 
However one conceives of extending hope's range to additional sec- 
ondary objects, the point for Aquinas is that no such objects of hope are 
unconditionally included in the ultimate end, though some may contin- 
gently be so. Thus, at certain times and places they may be appropriately 
hoped for as penultimate goods. It is not the case that these goods must 
be intentionally pursued under the description "something God uses to 
help me to my ultimate end, which is eternal fellowship with him." Still, 
they must in fact fall under such a description for the agent, and be hoped 
for (desired, loved, clung to) in ways appropriate to goods less than God, 
the final end of the virtue, and in ways appropriate to keeping God as the 
ultimate ground of hope's attainment of the good. 
Robert C. Roberts (2007) and William C. Mattison III (2012) both 
argue that the conditional and proximate nature of one's hope in lesser 
things shapes human moral life and practice in significant ways. When the 
virtue of hope fixes desire on the ultimate end as the only thing that can be 
appropriately desired in that way, it frees one from excessively valuing or 
relying on any other created goods as false substitutes for that end. Hope 
enables a kind of detachment from things in this world to which one might 
otherwise cling too tightly. As Mattison puts it, if one has the theological 
virtue of hope, one will not trust transient, fragile, and imperfect things to 
"save" (2012, 120). One will, rather, be able to value them for what they 
are-created things, finite goods-and to discipline the appetites rightly 
1.4 The End and Object of Hope 
Aquinas locates the theological virtue of hope in t~e will, or rational 
appetite, since this hope has God-a supersensory, spiritual good-as Its 
object. The will, on Aquinas's conception of the soul's powers, necessarily 
inclines human beings to their ultimate end; hope is one virtue that perfects 
its orientation. The upshot is that hope as a virtue has to do primarily with 
the ultimate end of human life. This way of defining hope raises questions 
about that for which humans can rightly hope. 
If the virtue of hope has a single, unique proper object-namely, God as 
the efficient and final cause of happiness-how then might other things also 
be properly hoped for? Aquinas answers that the single "ratio" of hope's 
"formal" object-that is, hoping in "God as divine assistant" toward one's 
ultimate end-can extend "materially" to many objects, just as faith in 
God as first truth includes all the particular articles of faith. The range of 
things that can be virtuously hoped for extends to anything by which <?od 
helps one in via: a challenging or reassuring word, mercy shown m a time 
of need by a friend, a word of correction, a supportive community, a ~oo.k, 
an experience, a good role model, and so on. As Dominic Doyle puts It, in 
hope the "desire for future happiness spills over into the present, such th~t 
hope can depend upon God's help now 'for anything' in order to at~alll 
God" (2011,40). In this way, it appears, there is little in theory that might 
be excluded from hope's secondary or material object. 
Additionally, hope can function as something of an architectonic or 
second-order virtue. Aquinas notes that charity has the function of ordering 
the activities of the other infused moral virtues to the human ultimate end, 
as one of the supernatural principles that order subordinate pow~rs an? 
those powers' particular objects. In regard to how hope is practiced, It 
seems that hope's own distinctive acts of trusting God's assistance can 
also order and inform other acts of particular virtues. For example, one 
could imagine an act of courageous endurance inspired by hope th~t one's 
perseverance or sacrifice is the most fitting expression of one's trust m God. 
of attainment is different for each of the two virtues, however. Hope attains God under the 
ratio of something good for me that is loved for my own sake (amor c?ncupiscentzae)-m 
Aquinas's words, "In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends It as hIS good. 
Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, 
he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own" (ST I-II 62.4). Chanty, on the 
other hand, attains God under the ratio of something good in itself, loved for its own sake 
(amor amicitiae). Although there is synergy between these two loves, the one does not reduce 
to the other according to Aquinas: "As stated above (Question 40, Article 7), m treatmg of 
the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. 
With regard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless It be desired 
and loved. Hope also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some 
good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards hope IS increased by 
love." Because "from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someon~: 
he begins to love him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more 111 him 
(ST I-II 62.4 ad 3). 
23 Aquinas calls all three theological virtues "principles" of the other infused moral virtues 
(which are infused dispositions concerning desires and aversions for more particular objects) 
in that their orientation of the person to her ultimate end affects the operation of all the 
virtues all the way down (ST II-II 63.3 and ads 2-3). Although he attributes a "commanding" 
function to charity alone (ST II-II 23.8) and names it a "principle" of all good works that 
can be directed toward the human ultimate end (ST II-II 65.3), perhaps hope can also be 
understood as directive of the operation of affections and virtues regarding more proximate 
objects that fall under its ratio, while it, in turn, is directed by charity. 
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to correspond to the goodness that is in those things, not some ultimate 
goodness one might project onto them via illusion or fantasy. Roberts 
says, "Not only does the hope of glory enable [the Christian] honestly 
to resign all earthly prospects; it also enables her to take those prospects 
up again and appreciate them for what they are" (2007, 153). In other 
words, hope prevents one from idolizing one's marriage, career, possessions, 
children, or one's once youthful and beautiful body. It is essential, on this 
view of the theological character of hope, that lesser goods-even great 
goods such as justice and loving human relationships-be hoped for as 
proximate and provisional, although one may certainly still desire these 
things intensely as great goods that contribute greatly to human flourishing. 
Desire for them is nonetheless properly proportioned when they are seen as 
signs and anticipations of the good that will bring complete fulfilment. As 
Augustine argues in the City of God, one values them rightly as significant 
comforts, encouragements, and provisions that enable one to make the 
journey toward something greater still, not the things that finally give rest 
(1993, Bk. XIX, Ch. 17). In the same way, losing these goods will not 
crush hope altogether and leave one in despair, even when these losses 
are excruciatingly painful. Nor will attainment of them tempt one to 
presumption, as if one had already secured one's fulfillment so one could 
rest in this life. One who hopes virtuously will be less likely to absolutize 
human achievements and human solutions to problems with the virtue 
rightly ordering these "not yet" activities to the ultimate end, and with 
hope rightly subsuming all human efforts under God's power. 
2 Andy: A Story of Hope? 
In the next section, I will argue that the portrayal of friendship between 
Andy Dufresne (Tim Robbins) and his fellow inmate Red (Morgan Freeman) 
in the film, The Shawshank Redemption (1994), is a compelling analogue 
of theological hope. But what about Andy himself? Understandably, 
analyses of hope in the film tend to focus on Andy, since he is the story's 
main character. Andy's resilience amid horrific conditions in prison and 
the escape he engineers for himself create a picture of heroic and godlike 
character, in contrast to Aquinas's conception of theological hope. 
Andy is incarcerated for nineteen years for the murder of his wife and 
her lover-a crime which he did not commit. Prison conditions are brutal, 
but Andy remains quietly resilient. At one point Andy is punished with two 
weeks straight in solitary confinement, known to inmates as "the hole," for 
playing a Mozart opera over the prison's public address system. When he 
emerges from his stay in the hole, Andy confidently asserts that his time in 
the hole was "the easiest time [he] ever did" because he had Mozart in his 
head and heart. Confronted by the others' bafflement, he offers an eloquent 
speech about the hope he has within himself, how it has kept him alive, and 
how it cannot be touched or taken away by prison guards or conditions. 
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Red, another prisoner, replies with a warning: "Hope is a dangerous thing"; 
it has "no place on the inside [of prison]" and "will make a man insane." 
Andy responds with a stark alternative: the example of their fellow inmate, 
Brooks, who upon being released from prison committed suicide.i" It is 
clear in this scene that Andy believes that what he calls hope is necessary to 
live-from the darkest depths of imprisonment (solitary confinement) and 
daily life in prison to the wide open world of freedom outside the prison's 
walls. Furthermore, hope is necessary to live in a fully human way. To fail 
to long for life on the outside, or at least keep its beauty within one's heart 
and mind, is to despair-to choose death. 
Beyond keeping Mozart alive in his heart (a kind of mental or emotional 
escape from the dreary reality of solitary confinement), Andy also plans 
to escape from prison in other (physical) ways. By the end of the film, the 
audience realizes that behind a pin-up poster, there is a hole he carved in 
his cell that leads to the sewage tunnels in the walls of the prison, through 
which he escapes. He appears a day later at a bank to collect funds diverted 
during his accounting work for the warden. It is enough money to begin a 
new life far away on the coast of Mexico. The plan took years to effect: 
Andy spent many nights spent quietly scraping the wall of his cell with 
a tiny rock hammer and as many days secretly emptying rocks from his 
pockets in the prison yard, literally tablespoons at a time. 
Throughout the film, Andy's character is sharply distinguished from that 
of the other prisoners.P Because of the duration of his suffering and his 
consistent response to it over almost two decades in prison, it is reasonable 
to conclude that Andy has dispositions most people would endorse as 
virtuous or admirable. His often unconventional behavior and responses to 
situations come from his settled habits and his reflective endorsement of 
their intrinsic value. Furthermore, his character is the single most important 
factor in helping him to live mentally and emotionally beyond the walls of 
the prison. 
Knowing Aquinas's account, however, one may be struck by how hu- 
manistic the portrait of Andy's hope is in the film (although it is made 
24 This might be taken as additional support for the relational character of hope. 
25 Unlike the other inmates, Andy is innocent of his crime. So escape (even if justified in 
Andy's case-a debatable point) is not an outcome to be hoped for or pursued by others. 
Andy has to recover from being treated like a criminal by an unjust system to break out of a 
place he does not belong, while the other prisoners have to recover from internalizing their 
criminal identity, often over the course of a life sentence without parole, while making prison 
their provisional home. In prison, one's Department of Corrections' number is a mark of 
identity as important, or more important, as one's name, and in interactions with others 'on 
the outside' one is an inmate, a convicted felon, and ex-con, etc. Incarceration and all of its 
indignities has a way of working itself into the very fabric of one's identity in dehumanizing 
ways. The main existential task for many actual prisoners is to find a way to recover their 
humanity and find hope in prison, rather than hoping to get out. My thanks to the inmates 
at Handlon Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, and the Louisiana State Penitentiary at 
Angola for helping me grasp this point and its importance. 
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more inspiring and perhaps alluring by the baptismal imagery in the escape 
scene). Andy is sustained in prison by his dedication to achieving justice 
for himself-that is, by engineering his own "redemption." He escapes 
entirely by his own power and effort, unaided by any others. His "creative 
accounting" with prison funds is an ingenious but criminal ploy after the 
justice system and the warden fail to honor his innocence time and again. 
His objective is his own physical freedom from prison-his longing for 
a life in paradise, at least the earthly paradise of a beach in Mexico. In 
this respect, the film can arguably serve as a metaphor: Shawshank prison 
is a picture of the life most people live and the futility of trying to find 
happiness in this world. Andy shows the possibility of life beyond its walls. 
Nevertheless, Andy's character provides a stirring portrait of the triumph of 
the human spirit, or perhaps one should say his superhuman spirit, which 
bursts the bonds of slavery to secure justice for itself with its own power. 
Although the film makes a case of Andy as a paradigmatic figure of hope, 
which Aquinas's account of hope as a theological virtue would lead one 
to reject, a more nuanced account of Andy's character as proto-hopeful 
has some warrant and carries useful implications for how to practice hope. 
Hope itself has two facets-the good hoped for, and the means that make its 
attainment possible. On the first point, hope's end, Andy seems to get some 
things right, at least in an anticipatory way. The goods he hopes for appear 
to be universal and shareable goods that both outlast and transcend himself, 
but which can still be counted as his own. On the second point, as already 
noted, he seems too independent and self-reliant to capture the fullness 
of Aquinas'S conception of the virtue. If Andy had a full conception of 
human happiness and freedom that extended not only beyond the bounds 
of Shawshank prison but also beyond the bounds of all the exigencies of 
this life, then he may have grasped his need for more than his own resources 
and his own power in attaining it. With its limited perspective, the film 
cannot say much more about the character of hope than this. 
Regarding hope's end, it seems too harsh to say that nothing but false 
or idolatrous hope keeps Andy alive, for reasons I will argue below. It is 
better to think of Andy's tendencies as proto-hope made possible, as Robert 
Miner suggests, by his virtue of magnanimity: "In itself, magnanimity is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the theological virtue of hope. But to 
suppose no connection between the two would be a mistake. Magnanimity 
prepares the soul for the theological virtue" (2009, 227). On the other 
hand, Andy's self-reliance makes ascribing any sort of trust or dependence 
to him problematic, and if one wants to think of hope paradigmatically in 
these terms, as Aquinas does, Andy does not model it. He does, however, 
value friendship-which again creates opportunities for him to develop 
hope. Furthermore, one need not make any claims about Andy himself 
having the virtue of hope to consider the film itself as a signpost that offers 
insight about hope and examples of how to practice it. 
One of the problems with nontheological hoped-for objects is that even 
if attained, they can be lost and one's hopes disappointed. Are the good 
things that Andy yearns for and works for like this? To make the case that 
Andy's desires are proto-hopeful, a counterfactual approach is promising. 
For it, one would need to ask, what role did Andy's desired and loved 
goods play in his motivation? Is Andy's hope completely satisfied when he 
escapes and sets up shop on the beach in Mexico? Even outside of prison, 
could his picture of the good life be fulfilled in this world? Alternately, 
what would have happened if Andy's escape plans had failed and he lived 
out the rest of his days at Shawshank prison? Would he have despaired and 
found nothing to live for?' 
Despite its happy ending, the film leaves the end for which Andy yearns 
ambiguous-or at least as a question for the viewer to ask himself or 
herself. Although the escape scene appears to be about Andy's solo triumph 
over evil and escape to his dream life, this is not the last scene of the 
film. Moreover, previous scenes in the film provide clues that this dream 
of escape is not all that Andy is living for. When Benedict XVI describes 
hope, he says, "While [hope's] community-oriented vision of the 'blessed 
life' is certainly directed beyond the present world, as such it also has to 
do with the building up of this world-in very different ways, according 
to the historical context and the possibilities offered or excluded thereby" 
(2007, sect. 14). As the Mozart scene illustrates, Andy loves the beauty 
of music. Even under threat of terrible punishment, he cannot quite bring 
himself to turn off the public address system before the last note of the duet 
fades away. It appears to be his appreciation for the aria's beauty, and not 
merely the desire to thumb his nose at the guards, that motivates him in this 
scene. He also has the impulse to share the music-again, quite possibly 
to rebel but also because he thinks he has something worth sharing and he 
wants others to be uplifted by its beauty, too. The goods he loves and longs 
for are inexhaustible enough to sustain further dreams and desires; they 
transcend his own individual life; and they are personally cherished, but 
also count as common goods that contribute to human flourishing in the 
whole community. The same dynamic is present in the library he creates 
and curates in the prison. Andy's intellectual world is greater than the 
prison walls, and therefore greater also than an earthly paradise in Mexico. 
Intellectual goods, too, are not merely his own; he attempts to offer them 
to his fellow inmates, and he acknowledges that they outstrip any good he 
himself already completely possesses (or can, perhaps, ever possess). 
In such actions, therefore, Andy persists in making prison life more than 
dreary drudgery for himself and for others; he seems consistently to be 
drawn to goods and beauty that elude his own final grasp, goods he values 
beyond the immediate moment and beyond his own personal enjoyment of 
them. They are not escapist fantasies that he controls; they are real goods 
that enlarge, energize, and enrich his current way of living. Even if his 
taste of them.is merely anticipatory, partial, and imperfect within prison, 
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for him they are signs of a better, more fully human life-one he values 
and yearns for. (In fact, his character is consistently marked by this sort 
of love and longing throughout the film.) Would he still long for these 
goods in Mexico? He would be freer to enjoy them, surely, but as goods 
larger than himself and his present grasp, they could, even in his life "on 
the outside," be future and transcendent and expansive. Furthermore, they 
are not merely things he can fully grasp and attain by his own power. He 
needs Mozart to compose the music and authors to write the books. Those 
created goods are gifts he receives from others and must rely on them for. 
By appreciating these goods and making them available to others, he in 
turn becomes a catalyst for others' hope. 
What is also striking about Andy is the stability of his character and his 
loves. Just as prison does not undercut who he is and the loves that sustain 
his life and keep him yearning for more, so life in Mexico is not an end 
attained so much as a new opportunity to pursue the same things, now with 
fewer constraints. No matter what his circumstances and regardless of what 
is taken away or what is restored, the basis of Andy's life remains secure; 
the things he holds on to are stable. This aspect of the film's story yields 
another structural analogue to hope. Explicating Hebrews 11:1, "Now 
faith is the substance of things hoped for," Benedict XVI describes the link 
between faith and hope in terms of its basis or the substance underlying it: 
This 'substance,' life's normal source of security, has been 
taken away from Christians in the course of persecution. 
They have stood firm, though, because they had found a 
better 'basis' for their existence-a basis that abides, that 
no one can take away. We must not overlook the link 
between these two types of 'substance,' between means of 
support or material basis and the word of faith and the 
'basis,' the 'substance' that endures. (2007, sect. 8) 
Andy loses all his possessions when imprisoned and yet has a "basis" on 
which to live, just as he holds on to Mozart even when the material basis 
of the music is taken away in solitary confinement. Thus even if Andy's 
character does not meet Aquinas's standard of hope, in these respects his 
life anticipates practices of hope and the effects hope should have on one's 
character. 
The counterfactua1 questions about the place Mexico holds within the 
structure of Andy's desire are meant to determine to what extent that idyllic 
life in Mexico is Andy's ultimate end, his self-chosen heaven on earth, 
attainable by his own efforts.r" The answer I have argued for here is that 
although Andy does not have theological hope, the structure of his desires 
is analogous to the way hope orders all earthly and human goods toward 
26 There are several counterfactuals to imagine here: How would Andy have lived if his escape 
had been thwarted? How would he react if his life in Mexico did not turn out to be what he 
thought, or if he settled instead in a poor, dusty town in the southern United States? 
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its final end. When practicing hope, then, counterfactual questions can 
also be useful in analyzing cases in which one is asked to give penultimate 
goods up; they can likewise prompt one to ask what the state of one's 
desires might be if one attained them in full. 27 If they were lost, would one 
despair? Would one presumptively rest in a self-made paradise if they were 
gained? As Andy would have to maintain his character if his escape were 
completely and finally unsuccessful and if it were completely and finally 
successful, so also asking a counterfactual question about what effect the 
loss of a particular good would have can provide hints about whether one's 
loves are rightly ordered or whether one is asking more of them than they 
can ever deliveri'' 
In the counterfactual test, then, there is an argument that Andy longs 
for goods not fully graspable in this life, a fact Andy himself seems to 
acknowledge. While the "something more" he hopes for is not spelled 
out, there is reason to think the film is implicitly offering something more 
subtle than a picture of self-made happiness and a shallow rendering of 
the triumph of the human spirit. Andy's attitudes and actions reveal that 
he loves created things-freedom, beauty, music, and his friend Red-for 
what they are, namely, things that give some consolation while one waits 
and things whose goodness points beyond themselves to a fuller and more 
fully human life, not things that he can finally or fully possess in this life. 
The film itself thus offers a picture of hope as a desire for these things as 
signs or anticipations (and likewise, consolations and encouragements) for 
the journey and not as ultimate ends graspable here and now. 
As much as the film offers an anticipatory and incipient view of hope, 
however, there is still the problem that Andy's hope in the film is completely 
self-reliant. If theological hope is ultimately the only way to be virtuously 
hopeful, then Andy's hope fails to be a virtue. The film does not offer 
any theological or even theistic interpretation of Andy's hope. His own 
intellectual, psychological, and physical abilities are the primary basis of his 
sense of the possibility of obtaining the future good he desires. He does not 
even rely on the other prisoners for his escape; on the contrary, he keeps his 
escape plans entirely to himself (in part, of course, to protect his friends). 
Even if one can argue for elements of transcendence in the ends and goods 
Andy hopes for, there is no dependence on anyone else, human or divine, 
evident in Andy's hope of escape. While he must rely on the artistry of 
Mozart to sustain him in prison and the natural cover of a thunderstorm to 
27 It seems, paradoxically, that in this life love for others-for instance, a spouse or dear 
friend-is plagued by both the temptation not to love that other enough and the temptation 
to love him or her too much. Relationships are often spoiled by selfish deficiencies, to be sure, 
but the argument Aquinas, Mattison, and others make is that they are also spoiled by a kind 
of excessive attachment. 
28 Compare Augustine (1991, Bk. Iv.vi) mourning the death of a beloved friend, whom 
Augustine loved "as if he would never die." 
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mask his escape, his final bid for freedom depicts a man acting on his own 
power.29 
Rather than arguing that Andy himself exemplifies hope, then, I concede 
that his disposition, however admirable, fails both to have as its telos a 
relationship with God and fails to manifest hope's key feature of depen- 
dence. Nevertheless, Andy's case is complicated. Even if he lacks hope as 
Aquinas defines it, he is noble, courageous, and clearly inspired by love for 
transcendent goods like beauty and truth. Andy is an example of a life that 
points to goodness beyond itself and the power of a character that can see 
goodness beyond the walls of a prison and manage to hold onto a measure 
of that goodness even within its walls. 
3 Red: A Story of Hope 
Despite the ambiguity found in the portrait of Andy's virtue, the film does 
offer a picture of hope's essential dependence in Red. It is telling that the 
entire film is narrated by Red, so the film is implicitly as concerned with 
the hope of Andy's friend as it is with Andy himself. Viewed as a story 
about Red, the film offers a clear and powerful analogy of the theological 
virtue of hope. Moreover, it depicts hope's means as requiring dependence 
and hope's end as friendship, although in this case it is a human friendship 
rather than friendship with God. 
29 Is there an acquired virtue of hope? The closest Aquinas comes to admitting such a 
phenomenon is his discussion of the controversial Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity, a virtue 
concerned with appropriate confidence in one's own power, although hope also plays a role 
in acts of courageous daring, such as Andy's escape. In the film, one sees Andy exemplifying 
something close to four virtues that Aquinas names as quasi-integral (and also potential) 
parts of the virtue of courage (ST II-II 128). Magnanimity is one of the four; the others 
are magnificence, patience, and perseverance. Magnanimity, also known as "confidence," is 
an expansiveness of heart and mind, a "stretching forth of the appetite" beyond a position 
of ease or comfort toward greater things that grow one's abilities. "Magnificence" enables 
one to mobilize the resources necessary for a great or heroic task. With patience, one must 
hold up well under the sorrow caused by the present evil or difficulty, endured firmly for the 
sake of what can yet be. Closely paired with patience is perseverance, a virtue concerned 
with tasks that take a long time and require delayed gratification. Andy must be constant 
in executing an escape plan that takes years of small, daily tasks. In summary, even if one 
wanted to deny that Andy has the theological virtue of hope, on the terms Aquinas defines it, 
one might still account for the admiration of his character via these other virtues indirectly 
connected to the passion of hope via their relationship to the cardinal virtue of courage. The 
difficulty in accounting for Andy's hopefulness by means of magnanimity and its associated 
virtues is that it runs up against the same problem in Aquinas's account, namely, that proper 
magnanimity-even though it concerns what is in the agent's own power, rather than reliance 
on another-still requires that the agent recognize that what is in her power is a gift of grace, 
and not merely a matter of human capacities: "magnanimity makes a person deem himself 
worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God" (ST II-II 129.3 ad 
4). As I have argued elsewhere, in this respect, magnanimity too is a virtue of acknowledged 
dependence. Furthermore, Aquinas says at the end of his account of patience and perseverance 
that both are infused virtues (ST II-II 136.3 and 137.4). 
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Red learns to hope from Andy. Like the theological virtue, which is 
infused, his hope is received as a gift from another. Andy's friendship and 
Andy's vision of beauty and goodness beyond what prison affords gradually 
bring Red from apathy and despair to hope. With Andy's help, both Red's 
imagination and his appetite are stretched beyond what he has previously 
yearned for or believed possible for himself. Likewise, in the case of the 
theological virtue, the future good to be attained with difficulty is union 
with God (human beings' supernatural end), a good that can be made 
known and reached only with God's assistance. 
In the film, Red's hope mirrors the structure and end of theological hope 
in a variety of ways. While Red waits in prison, he longs to be with his 
beloved friend again. When he is released, Red understands that Andy has 
gone before him to show him the way to a new life. Because of Andy, Red 
then patterns his pursuit of all other goods according to his longing for a 
new, fuller life in a world beyond the only one he has ever known. Insofar 
as the film's depiction of Shawshank prison symbolizes the suffering of this 
life and the pointlessness of trying to find one's ultimate peace there, Red's 
decision, upon his release, to follow Andy to Mexico is analogous to the 
Christian choice to put one's hope in things not yet seen, based on faith 
and trust in another's word-echoing the Hebrews 11 definition of faith. 
After his release, Red goes to find Andy's letter and tucks it into his 
pocket, beckoned by confidence (con-fides: faith in the word of another) in 
the words, "I will be hoping that this letter finds you and finds you well, 
Your friend, Andy." The letter, like revelation and its promises, is both 
a confirmation of Andy's friendship now and a promise that points him 
onward. Andy's friendship with Red in prison gives Red a foretaste of a 
greater life of friendship when they are both free. The attraction of such a 
life draws Red out of the hotel room where the despairing and friendless 
Brooks chose to end his life, and into a bus station, a symbol of his life 
in via. Like the letter, all other goods now serve the end of pursuing a 
life in friendship with Andy. Red uses the cash for a bus ticket, but both 
the cash and ticket are goods for him only in relation to his journey and 
its goal. They are, like earthly goods, not to be clung to as ultimate or 
as assuring fulfilment in themselves. As signs and aids for Red, they are 
important to him as resources enabling him to anticipate new life and 
move toward its realization. Red is now living forward in hope; he is on 
a journey with an (only partly grasped) end in mind-a destination that 
is more than personal freedom or an earthly paradise: it is a relationship 
of love. For Red, being with Andy is the telos. As Benedict points out, 
the very nature of faith-informed theological hope is that its "substance" 
is God himself, rather than the contingent, fragile, and ultimately losable 
material conditions of this life, even at their best. 
In the film, the sign-pointing function of hoped-for lesser goods is, I 
think, also signaled. In his letter to Red, Andy describes a project and 
future plans and the need for a partner; therefore, the freedom he longed 
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for was not an end but the beginning of a new life. Red finds Andy on 
the beach, not in a lawn chair getting tan and sipping pifia coladas, but 
working on a boat-perhaps itself a sign of his continuing journey toward 
further ho~izons and implying further movement toward a good not yet 
possessed.e" Such intermediate goods and projects and partners serve as 
Icons of a kind of life and a fullness of goodness even a paradise on earth 
cannot fully deliver. This is why good things, properly hoped for, can 
often make one weep and rejoice at the same time; their full beauty is fully 
revealed only with their absolute fragility and limitations. There is both 
sweetness and. pai~ful yearning in the experience of hope, an experience 
matching Aquinas s account of the complex structure of this virtue. Here, 
too, th~ film provides a picture of the character of hope as a virtue shaping 
all of Me, even the best (paradise) this life can offer. 
When Red finally arrives in Mexico, he and Andy embrace. It is the 
last shot of the film. In one sense they are finally at rest-secure in their 
friendship and secure in their life of freedom. Yet the final shot of the film 
is n~t a close-up of the bliss on each of their faces, but a God's-eye point 
of view that dwarfs the figures on the beach. The choice of camera shot 
could be interpreted as a way of indicating to the viewer that what Andy 
and Red have learned and loved so far is a beginning, not an ending, a 
commitment that will stretch their longings even further, beyond what their 
limited human perspective from the beach can grasp. 
Benedict XVI sums up both the promise and the limitations of the film's 
portrayal of Andy's and Red's redemption well in these words: 
[Man is] redeemed by love. This applies even in terms of 
this present world. When someone has the experience of 
a great love in his life, this is a moment of 'redemption' 
which gives a new meaning to his life. But soon he will 
also realize that the love bestowed upon him cannot by 
itself resolve the question of his life. It is a love that re- 
mains fragile. It can be destroyed be death. The human 
being needs unconditional love .... If this absolute love 
[of God] exists, with its absolute certainty, then-only 
then-is man 'redeemed,' whatever should happen to him 
in his particular circumstances. (2007, sect. 26) 
4 Practices of Hope 
Aquinas'S account of the theological virtue and Red's reliance on Andy's 
friendship together show the power of a life and character shaped by hope. 
One could sort the practices of hope found in these sources into roughly 
30 The openness of the landscape and seascape in this scene are compelling. The ocean 
stretches out farther than one can see. Thanks to Matthew Lamb for pointing out the possible 
significance of the boat. 
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two categories: first, practices that concern the object of hope (hope's end), 
and second, practices that concern reliance on another both to develop the 
virtue and to attain that object (hope's means). Friendship is a key practice 
of hope, however, because it spans both of these categories. 
The film, working on a human and therefore analogous level, vividly 
portrays the catalyzing and sustaining power of friendship in a life of hope, 
a point I will return to when considering practices of the theological virtue 
in particular. Encouragement to hope comes through friends in a variety of 
ways: for example, they are models of the virtue; they teach one about new 
goods and new places, and thereby attract one to new and higher loves; 
they write to one; and they make and keep their promises, teaching one 
to trust and rely on them. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who spent time in prison 
himself, describes fellowship with other believers as a great consolation and 
encouragement, a "source of joy and strength" (1957, 19-20). Red's hope 
is born and sustained through friendship with Andy, who sees him not in 
terms of his past criminal record but in terms of their present relationship 
and future together. By contrast, many prisoners, rejected and forgotten by 
family and friends, struggle with loneliness and despair even to the point of 
suicide. 
Walter Bruggemann (2014, 125) writes, "Hope is a tenacious act of 
imagination given in dream, oracle [or prophecy J, narrative, and song." 
With respect to hope's object, the film gives one a reason to support the 
arts (both music and the visual arts, including films)-for their power to 
help one imagine and expand one's vision of goodness. As friends do on 
the personal level, on a cultural level artists can inspire attraction to goods 
that extend one's sense of possibility and enlarge one's longings. Andy's 
cell walls are covered with reproductions of classic art, which stand in 
stark contrast to the crude pin-up poster that hides his escape hole. Music, 
another common and self-transcending good, lifts one's spirits and inspires 
one to savor beauty beyond the moment. Singing can thus be a practice 
of hope-not singing for an audience or for show, but singing to express 
oneself and to join in a chorus with others, to lament or to remember or to 
lift one's spirits.i! One might argue that Andy's moment with Mozart plays 
the same sort of role as Paul's and Silas's songs in prison in the midst of 
persecution (Acts 16:25);32 the other prisoners listened and were inspired 
to inhabit a world beyond the walls of prison. Why sing instead of speaking 
one's hope? Perhaps because "our spoken words are inadequate to express 
what we want to say, that the burden of our song goes far beyond all human 
words" (Bonhoeffer 1957, 58). Or as Red puts it when recalling Andy's 
choice to play The Marriage of Figaro over the prison's public address 
system, 
31 The final chorus of Les Miserables is another example of this practice. 
32 All scriptural citations are from the New International Version. 
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I have no idea to this day what those two Italian ladies were 
singing about .... I'd like to think they were singing about 
something so beautiful it can't be expressed in words and 
makes your heart ache because of it. I tell you those voices 
soared, higher and farther than anybody in a gray place 
~ares to dream. It was like some beautiful bird flapped 
into our drab little cage and made those walls dissolve 
away. And for the briefest of moments, every last man at 
Shawshank felt free. 
Through these experiences of transcendent beauty, the film shows that 
hu.man flourishing requires centering one's life around and investing in 
spiritual goods that are larger than the self-relationships and loves and 
projects and dreams that teach one to reach further, to long for more. 
. The film off~rs evidence that suffering, too, can cultivate hope because 
It keeps one painfully aware of one's hunger for a kind of love and peace 
that the world cannot deliver. Both Red and Andy become aware of 
their need for hope in Shawshank because prison destroys all illusions of 
s~tisfaction or flourishing within its walls. Suffering keeps one from the 
VICe of presumption by reminding one of a truth that it easy to ignore or 
deny. w~en ~ne lives in earthly paradises and not in prisons: that nothing 
in this life WIll finally or fully give rest to desire. Without suffering and the 
detachment or relinquishment it demands, one can more easily pretend that 
one is already at rest, and that one does not need hope. 
Finally, hope-especially hope in the help of another-requires waiting. 
Aquinas describes this sort of hope as ex-spectatio-literally, looking out- 
Side oneself to another whose assistance is essential both for believing in 
the possibility of attaining the good and also actually obtaining it (ST I-II 
40.2 ad 1; II-II 17.1 and 4). When one's sense of possibility depends on 
another, it is not entirely up to oneself to determine when and where and 
how the good will be attained. Waiting implies a lack of control, and yet 
there is a difference between hopeful expectation and merely killing time. 
The pnson context makes clear that how one handles time is also a practice 
of hope. The inmates who are simply "doing time" are not waiting for 
anything, The passing of time feels endless because it is purposeless coping 
devoid of any expectation of goodness. Hopeful waiting not only means 
remaining ready to receive something from another, but also looking out 
for good things to come, believing and trusting that one's life has a telos 
that one can expect to be good. In theological hope, "waiting for the Lord" 
is an activity, because it takes psychological and spiritual effort to remain 
in a position of trust when one cannot see what lies ahead and the outcome 
is not in one's power (e.g., Ps. 27:14). To wait in hope is to remain open 
to the goodness longed for and not give up on the one with the power to 
deliver it.33 While suffering teaches one to let go of false hopes, waiting is 
33 For an example of such stories of waiting, see chapters 11 and 12 of Stump (2010). 
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a crucible in which one learns that despairing resignation-giving up on 
one's genuine good-is the enemy of true hope. 
On an even more explicitly theological note, what sort of practices might 
one cultivate, especially when the ground of one's sense of possibility is 
. the help of another? I will not attempt to give an exhaustive list; however, 
Shawshank also gets some important features of hope right here, even if it 
can speak of them in only an analogous way. The film is ostensibly about 
hope, but it is equally a film about friendship and the difference friendship 
makes for cultivating hope. Red's hope is a compelling metaphor for the 
theological virtue-hope in the help of another. Red learns for the first time 
what hope looks like through Andy's life and character. Red learns from 
Andy already in prison, long before Andy's escape or Red's release, that 
their destination is a real place; Andy teaches him the name of the town 
that will be their common destination, and tells him the spot in the field 
to dig for a message, should Red decide to follow him in hope. This is, in 
a parallel way, what God, through the theological virtue of faith, reveals 
in this life about the human ultimate end. Later, Red journeys to Mexico 
through the resources Andy provides. Red gets a letter from Andy after 
Red's release from prison and the gift of cash to pay his way there, a way 
he has no way to pay for with his own resources. Just as importantly, Red 
has the gift of Andy's friendship for the journey: first in person when they 
are both inside prison, as an encouragement while they wait, then again 
in the letter's assurance and promise of what lies at the journey's end, and 
finally in person again when they are reunited in their Mexican paradise. 
The film ends with Red saying "I hope" as he finds Andy on the beach 
and they embrace. It is clear that Red does not love Andy merely for the 
sake of his assistance; he loves him as a friend whose company, presence, 
and friendship he cherishes for their own sake. For Andy and Red, as for 
Aquinas's theological portrait, the love of friendship is an essential part of 
practicing hope and encouraging others to practice it, too. 
The film thus depicts how human beings can help each other to cultivate 
hope by mirroring and participating in the friendship of God toward one 
another. Although this help can also be exemplified in wider forms of 
solidarity and benevolence, the personal nature of the assistance, is, I 
think, important for practices of hope because hope involves one's own 
personal ultimate good. Those who assist, therefore, must care about me 
and my reaching my end. And for this the relationship of friendship seems 
best suited. Practices of hope found in the film include providing and 
accepting provision for the physical means to make the journey (the cash 
for a bus ticket has as its spiritual analog the corporal works of mercy, 
such as feeding the hungry, offering shelter to the homeless). They also 
include encouraging others and sharing intangible goods that keep one's 
spirits alive for the journey (e.g., the spiritual works of mercy, comforting 
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the sorrowfull.r" Human promises made and kept faithfully anticipate 
and point to God's promises, his faithfulness, and his Word, which is the 
ultimate basis of theological hope. 
Practicing the theological virtue of hope thus also means learning to 
receive help: both learning to ask for it and to accept it graciously, rather 
than closing oneself off from others and striving for self-sufficiency. While 
many prefer to be independent and take care of themselves, or perhaps 
to be the giver of help (i.e., the person with plenty of resources, power, 
and control), learning to be dependent creatures-who need to receive 
gifts and particularly the gift of friendship to see the good fully and be 
taught to yearn for it properly-may be one of the most important ways 
to practice hope. Developing strong friendships and building communities 
of mutual interdependence are also practices of hope on both the human 
and the divine level, as Aquinas notes: "[E]very human being needs, first, 
the Divine assistance,[and] secondly, even human assistance, since we are 
naturally social animals .... Accordingly, in so far as we need others, it 
belongs to the [virtuous] to have confidence in others, for it is also a point 
of excellence in us to have at hand those who can help us" (ST II-II 129.6). 
The Shawshank Redemption shows viewers how such reliance on others 
in love and friendship is essential for cultivating and sustaining Red's 
hope. For Aquinas, in a parallel way, hope is practiced through acts of 
regular reliance on God's help-most obviously, perhaps, through the 
practice of petitionary prayer (ST II-II 17.2 obj. and ad 2; II-II 17.3 obj. 
2). The posture of prayer itself puts one in a position of total dependence, 
a position acknowledging one's status as both a creature before an all- 
powerful Creator and a child before a merciful Father. That prayer is a 
practice of the theological virtue of hope is seen by contrast with hope's 
opposing vices. The presumptuous person will not feel the need to pray, for 
she no longer sees herself in need of further assistance to her end; she has 
"got it made." The despairing person, on the other hand, will not pray, but 
for different reasons: he assumes God will not help him, or he assumes he 
is beyond the reach of God's redeeming power and mercy. To pray is to ask 
for assistance expecting to receive it and to acknowledge one's dependence 
and need for redemption while renewing one's trust in the promises and 
faithfulness of God to deliver what is needed. 
The two thieves on the crosses next to Jesus at Golgotha exemplify hope 
and despair in this way: one rejects Christ's redemptive assistance, choosing 
to shoulder his own punishment unto death, while the other one prays, 
34 Forgiveness is also on this list of spiritual works of mercy, and one might argue that 
forgiveness itself is a practice of hope, in part because it entrusts all offenses against oneself, 
like one entrusts one's own offenses against God, to the divine justice and mercy. Rather than 
demanding that all justice be settled in this life, and it lives in anticipation of the final peace 
that will come in the next life when human hopes are fulfilled. The bishop and Jean Valjean 
in Victor Hugo's Les Miserables provide a vivid portrait of forgiveness as a practice that is 
characteristic of hope. 
"Jesus, remember me, when you come into your kingdom" (Luke 23:42-43). 
Andy, too, remembers Red, even as he goes ahead of Red to his Mexican 
paradise. His leaving shows Red that prison life is not all there is, and 
when he leaves, he gives Red words of invitation and promise to follow 
when he is released. 
For Red, the act of remembering Andy in that bleak hotel room yields 
hope for new life and keeps him from dying alone in despair, like Brooks and 
the second thief. It may seem ironic that practicing hope, a forward-looking 
virtue and a prayer for things yet to be, should also involve remembering the 
past. The film depicts Red in prison after Andy's escape, remembering his 
friend, their nineteen-year history together, and the radically new frame of 
possibility enacted by Andy's breakout. To follow Andy, Red must keep in 
mind the name of the town in Mexico that Andy told him. In a parallel way, 
the psalmists recount the narrative events of God's faithfulness in keeping 
his promises to Israel, and partakers in the Eucharist memorialize Christ's 
sacrifice. These examples are evidence that acts of remembrance can be 
practices of hope insofar as the remembered past renews one's reasons 
to hold fast to promises for the future. Remembering promises already 
kept and love already given, prompted by the reminders of friends and the 
community of the faithful, encourages those who hope to continue relying 
on God and longing for a life of perfect friendship with him. 
5 Conclusion 
I have argued that The Shawshank Redemption pictures the ways that hope 
is essential for human flourishing. Through the story of Red, the film also 
pictures human friendships as central to practices of hopeful reliance on 
others. Seen against Aquinas's framework, the film's depiction of the virtue 
of hope and its practice can only gesture imperfectly at the theological 
dimensions of hope. Both sources in dialogue with each other however, 
show how hope-as a virtue-can be practiced, especially in friendships 
both human and divine. 
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LITURGICAL SINGING 
Terence Cuneo 
Abstract: This is an essay on two topics-singing and 
liturgy-that lie well outside the standard repertoire of 
topics that form the subject matter of contemporary phi- 
losophy of religion, let alone Anglo-American philosophy 
more generally. Nonetheless, I maintain that thinking 
through the topic of liturgical singing can bear philosophi- 
cal fruit. My discussion takes as its starting point the strik- 
ing fact that the liturgies of Eastern Christianity are almost 
entirely sung. I explore the question why this would be 
especially fitting. The answer I offer draws upon recent 
work in philosophy of literature; collective action, and 
musical cognition, arguing that what I call the secondary 
form of the liturgy and its content mesh in such a way 
that, when an assembly sings the content of the liturgical 
script, it thereby instantiates important dimensions of its 
content. 
It is a striking feature of the Eastern Christian liturgies that they are almost 
entirely sung.! With the exception of the homily, almost nothing in these 
liturgies is merely spoken. Moreover, aside from the occasional gesture, 
such as when the priest bows to the assembled, virtually none of its actions 
is performed in silence. Instead, singing accompanies nearly all the actions 
that constitute these liturgies, including the action around which they 
revolve, namely, eating the Eucharistic meal. 
To my knowledge, the Eastern liturgies are unique among the Christian 
liturgies in this regard; none of the other Christian liturgies incorporates 
singing to the extent to which the Eastern liturgies do. Why is that? 
A satisfactory reply to this question would be complex, but let me gesture 
toward the beginnings of an answer. All the liturgies in the Christian 
tradition exhibit an orientation, emphasizing certain activities rather than 
others. Many of the liturgies that belong to the Reformed traditions, for 
example, emphasize proclamation, placing the sermon at the center of the 
service. Any singing that occurs in these liturgies is supposed to complement 
1 Unless I indicate otherwise, when I speak of the Eastern liturgies, I'll have the Eucharistic 
liturgies in mind. I should also note that I am working with a semi-idealized type of these 
liturgies in which many portions of the liturgical script are sung by the congregation (and not 
simply the choir, chanters, or celebrant). 
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